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ABSTRACT
Security is a key-challenge for software engineering, espe-
cially when considering access control and software evolu-
tions. No satisfying solution exists for maintaining the align-
ment of access control policies with the business logic. Cur-
rent implementations of access control rely on the separation
between the policy and the application code. In practice,
this separation is not so strict and some rules are hard-
coded within the application, making the evolution of the
policy difficult. We propose a new methodology for imple-
menting security-driven applications. From a policy defined
by a security expert, we generate an architectural model, re-
flecting the access control policy. We leverage the advances
in the models@runtime domain to keep this model synchro-
nized with the running system. When the policy is updated,
the architectural model is updated, which in turn reconfig-
ures the running system. As a proof of concept, we apply
the approach to the development of a library management
system.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D2.11 [Software Engineering]: Software Architectures;
K6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
General Terms
Design, Security
Keywords
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ing, Models@Runtime
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1. INTRODUCTION
Security is a key issue in modern software-intensive systems
driving the every-day life of billions of people all around
the world. Software systems deployed in large companies,
banks, airports, etc, must be available 24/7 with a high
level of security. Among different security concerns (user
authentication, data encryption, etc), access control plays a
critical role. It ensures that users, depending on their roles,
can only access the resources they are supposed to access.
Designing, implementing and executing such systems re-
quires the highest attention from the different stakeholders.
A small error in the specification or in the implementation
of the access control concern could make a critical resource
accessible to standard users. Several security models, like
RBAC [7] or OrBAC [11], propose high-level abstractions to
security experts in order to specify access control policies.
The current implementation techniques consist in using a
standard architecture that involves designing a dedicated
security component, called the policy decision point (PDP),
which can be configured independently from the rest of the
implementation containing the business logic of the appli-
cation. The execution of functions in the business logic in-
cludes calls to the PDP (called PEPs - policy enforcement
points), which grants or denies access to the protected re-
sources/functionalities of the system. Such an architecture
can for example be implemented with Aspect-Oriented Pro-
gramming [12, 18] techniques.
The main limitation of the current implementation tech-
niques is that they do not allow for flexible access control
mechanisms. In fact, the access control policy cannot be
modified without previously modifying the code to support
the new access control rule. This is an expected effect of the
separation between the security code (access control mech-
anism) and the functional code. In fact, because of this ap-
proach, the functional code may contain some hard-coded
access control mechanisms implementing some access con-
trol rules. Modifying these specific rules requires locating
these hidden mechanisms and removing them. In this pa-
per, we address this issue by providing flexible access control
mechanisms.
In this paper, we propose to leverage Model-Driven Engi-
neering (MDE) techniques to provide a very flexible ap-
proach for managing access control. On one side, access con-
trol policies are defined by security experts, using a Domain-
Specific Modeling Language (DSML), which describes the
concepts of access control, as well as their relationships.
On the other side, the application is designed using an-
other DSML for describing the architecture of a system in
terms of components and bindings. This component-based
software architecture only contains the business components
of the application, which encapsulate the functionalities of
the system, without any security concern. Then, we define
mappings between both DSMLs describing how security con-
cepts are mapped to architectural concepts. We use these
mappings to fully generate an architecture that enforces the
security rules. When the security policy is updated, the
architecture is also updated. Finally, we leverage the no-
tion of models@runtime in order to keep the architectural
model (itself synchronized with the access control model)
synchronized with the running system. This way, we can
dynamically update the running system in order to reflect
changes in the security policy. Only users who have the right
to access a resource can actually access this resource.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 presents a background on access control and motivates the
need for more flexible access control policies. Section 3 de-
scribes an overview of our approach. Section 4 presents the
security and the architecture metamodels, and how they are
composed. Section 5 describes how the architecture model is
impacted when the security policy is updated, and how these
changes are automatically reflected at runtime. Section 6
presents related work. Section 7 concludes and presents fu-
ture work.
2. MOTIVATIONS FORDYNAMICACCESS
CONTROL
Access Control aims at securing a system by controlling the
access of users, processes or components (or any other en-
tity) to the resources of the system. This access is controlled
through the enforcement of an access control policy, which
expresses a set of rules for allowing or denying the access to
the system resources. Several access control models [7, 11]
allow defining access control policies.
This section presents the motivation behind the need for a
more dynamic access control. To show the limitation of the
existing platforms, we first present the existing architecture
for implementing access control policies. Then we explain
the various reasons that lead to the need to provide a new
approach for enforcing dynamic access control policies.
2.1 Current Architecture forManaging Access
Control
Figure 1 depicts a security architecture typically used for
implementing the security policy. Roughly, there are two
main components:
• The Policy Decision Point (PDP) is the point where
policy decisions are made. It encapsulates the Ac-
cess Control Policy and implements a mechanism to
process requests coming from the business logic (via
the PEP) and returns a response which can be “deny”
or “permit”. Policies can be stored in various ways:
Data Base, eXtensible Access Control Markup Lan-
guage (XACML) files, etc.
• The Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is the point in
the business logic where the policy decisions are en-
forced. It is a security mechanism, which has been in-
tentionally inserted in the application functional code.
Before the service is executed, the PEP sends a re-
quest to the PDP to get the suitable response (grant
or deny), which depends on the user requesting the ser-
vice, and on the current context. Based on the PDP
response, if the access is granted the service executes,
else the access is denied and the PEP forbids the exe-
cution of the service.
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Figure 1: The Security Architecture
This architecture clearly separates the access control deci-
sion from its enforcement, thus improving the testability of
the system. In addition, the security rules are centralized,
improving the observability of the system. One can easily
monitor the enforced security rules to detect bugs or security
flaws.
2.2 Limitations of Current Approaches
Although current approaches allow the security rules to be
updated and modified, the enforcement of these modifica-
tions is problematic. This is due to the existence of some ac-
cess control mechanisms hard-coded into the business logic.
These hidden mechanisms enforce some of the access con-
trol rules making the system’s policy more rigid and diffi-
cult to modify. There are two kinds of mechanisms, identi-
fied in [18]; the implicit mechanisms and the explicit mech-
anisms. The implicit mechanisms are implemented by con-
struction through the design model or the deployment archi-
tecture. For instance, Figure 2 illustrates such an implicit
mechanism. In this example, by construction, the secretaries
are not allowed to update accounts. The access control pol-
icy can however be easily updated to allow secretaries to up-
date accounts. However, to enforce this new rule, refactoring
is required. A simple refactoring would consist of moving the
association “access” and the methods to the level of the class
Personnel. Such a refactoring would also allow any Person-
nel instance to access the personnel accounts, which may be
an unexpected change. So, the program will have to be care-
fully modified in several locations to implement the desired
evolution of the access control policy.
Figure 2: Implicit security mechanism
The second kind of hidden mechanisms is the explicit mech-
anisms, which are implemented within some portions of the
application code that is not documented. Figure 3 shows an
example of these explicit mechanisms:
1 public void borrowBook(Book b, User user) {
2 // visible mechanism , call to the security
policy service
3 SecurityPolicyService.check(user ,
4 SecurityModel.BORROW_METHOD ,Book.class ,
SecurityModel.DEFAULT_CONTEXT);
5 //do something else
6 // hidden mechanism
7 i f (getDayOfWeek ().equals(‘‘Sunday ’’) ||
8 getDayOfWeek ().equals(‘‘Saturday ’’)) {
9 //not authorized -> throw a business
exception
10 Throw new BusinessException(‘‘Not allowed to
borrow in week -ends’’);
11 }
12 }
Figure 3: Explicit security mechanism
In the body of the method, after the PEP call to the PDP,
a new check is done which forbids borrowing books during
week-ends. If the policy has to be modified to allow borrow-
ing books during week-ends, this hidden mechanism should
be located and deleted.
2.3 Discussion
Both the explicit and the implicit mechanisms reduce the
flexibility of the system. They are also inevitable since they
are due to the way the system is developed. In fact, the
security mechanism (the PDP) is developed separately from
the application logic and then integrated into the applica-
tion logic by the PEP. For these reasons, we need to take
into account access control during the modeling and the de-
ployment of secured systems. This is the main contribution
of this work, which involves providing a complete process
that includes access control throughout the modeling and
the deployment processes.
3. OVERVIEW
In commercial and government environments, any change to
the security policies normally requires impact assessments,
risk analysis and such changes should go through the RFC
(Request for Change) process. However, in case of urgency
(crisis events, intrusion detection, server crashes, interop-
erability with external systems to deal with a critical situ-
ation), the adaptation of a security policy at runtime is a
necessity. This adaptation may or may not have been al-
ready predicted or planned.
The proposed approach and the combination of composition
and dynamic adaptation techniques shown in Figure 4 show
how the security policy can be adapted conforming to a de-
fined adaptation plan or in an unplanned way. The security
adaptation mechanisms we propose deal with the challenging
issue of how to provide running systems supporting planned
and unplanned security policy adaptations. The inputs of
the process are two independent models: the business archi-
tecture model of the system and the security model. These
two models are expressed in different domain-specific mod-
eling languages: the core business architecture with an ar-
chitecture modeling language (Section 4.2) and the security
policy with an access-control language (Section 4.1). By
dynamically composing the security model with the archi-
tecture model, the approach allows adapting the application
security policy according to pre-defined adaptation rules but
also to cope with any unplanned changes of the security
model.
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Figure 4: Overview of the proposed approach
The adaptive security model contains a set of access control
rules and a description of the context in which these rules
apply. At runtime, depending on the context information
coming from the system the appropriate set of rules has to
be chosen. This is the reasoning shown as (1) in Figure 4.
The reasoning phase processes the security model based on
the context information coming from the system to produce
the security policy to be enforced. Basically, when some
events are triggered, security rules can be activated or de-
activated. Once the appropriate security policy has been
defined, it has to be composed into the architecture model
of the application, see (2) in Figure 4. The models to com-
pose here are of different nature: an architecture model on
one side and a security policy on the other side. The com-
position is done in two steps:
1. the security policy is transformed into an architecture
model realizing it,
2. this architecture model is composed with the business
architecture model
The implementation of this complex composition operator
is discussed in section 4. The output of the composition is a
plain architecture model which enforces the security policy
in the application. Step (3) and (4) in Figure 4 correspond
to the synchronization of the architecture model with the
running system and the monitoring of the system environ-
ment. For both of these tasks, the approach proposed in
this paper reuses existing runtime adaptation techniques.
Basically the idea is to leverage monitoring and runtime re-
configuration mechanisms offered by middleware platforms
in order to extract context information and update the run-
ning system to match the desired architecture. Finally, point
(5) in Figure 4 corresponds to an evolution of the security
model. The proposed approach allows changing the security
model at any point in time. Here, it does not only consist
in activating/deactivating existing rules, but also consists
in adding, removing or updating rules or roles. This paper
focuses on how the architecture (and the running system)
causally evolves when the security policy is updated. Con-
text monitoring and reasoning can be realized by existing
adaptive system modeling techniques such as [8].
4. COMPOSING SECURITY AND ARCHI-
TECTURE METAMODELS
In this section, we describe how we compose the architecture
metamodel into the security metamodel. We first introduce
a generic metamodel for describing access control policies.
Then, we introduce our generic metamodel for describing
component-based architecture. Finally, we detail how we
map security concepts to architectural concepts.
4.1 A Generic Metamodel for Describing
Access Control Policies
The metamodel we use to describe access control policies is
illustrated in Figure 12 at the end of this paper. It defines
the concepts and their relationships needed to design access
control models. The root concept is the Policy. A policy
contains Resources, Roles, Users and Rules. A resource (e.g.,
a book) define some actions (e.g., borrow). Each user of the
system has one role. Rules allow specifying the action the
users (via their role) can perform on the resources of the
system. We distinguish two types of rules:
• Permission: specifies the actions that the user of a
given role can perform. By default, users can access
the actions associated with their roles.
• Delegation: specifies the actions that a user (delega-
tor) delegates to another user (delegatee). By default,
no delegation is active.
Each rule can be associated with a context. A context spec-
ifies when a rule should be active, depending of the environ-
ment. For example, users can borrow books from Monday
to Friday if they have not exceeded their quota. A context
is a boolean expression involving some context variables. A
metamodel for describing such context can be found in [8].
Rules with no associated context are active by default, but
could be deactivated.
4.2 A Core Metamodel for (Runtime)
Architectures
Our generic metamodel is illustrated in Figure 13 at then
end of this paper. A component type contains some ports.
Each port has a UML-like cardinality (upper and lower bounds)
indicating if the port is optional (lowerBound = 0) or manda-
tory (lowerBound > 0). It also indicates if the port only
allows single bindings (upperBound = 1) or multiple bind-
ings (upperBound > 1). A port also declares a role (client
or server) and is associated to a service. A service encapsu-
lates some operations, defined by a name, a return type and
some parameters. A service has a similar structure as Java
interface.
A component instance has a type and a state (ON/OFF),
specifying whether the component is started or stopped. It
can be bound to other instances by a transmission binding,
linking a provided service (server port) to a required service
(client port). A composite instance can additionally declare
sub-instances and delegation bindings. A delegation binding
specifies that a service from a sub-component is exported by
the composite instance.
4.3 Mapping Security Concepts to Architec-
tural Concepts
In this sub-section we propose to map the security con-
cepts (Section 4.1) to architectural concepts (Section 4.2).
This mapping is performed by the seamless weaving engine
provided by Kermeta [19] that allows designers to extend
a metamodel with additional elements1: attributes, refer-
ences, contracts (invariants and pre/post conditions), op-
erations (or implement an already existing abstract opera-
tion). Kermeta allows designer to extend their metamodels
defined in Ecore/EMF2 (which is the defacto standard inte-
grated into Eclipse to design metamodels) with operational
semantics. It makes it possible to check, simulate, trans-
form models using a Java-like imperative style combined
with OCL-like constructs dedicated to the navigation into
models.
The rationale of this mapping is to automatically reflect the
access control policy at the architectural level. This map-
ping is realized as follows, and illustrated in Figures 5, 6
and 7:
• Each resource is mapped to a component instance (Fig-
ure 5). This proxy component provides and requires all
the services offered by the resource. Additionally, each
resource is mapped to a set of business components,
from the base architecture, realizing the resource. The
mapping with business components is provided by the
designer, via a graphical editor.
• Each action is mapped to an operation (Figure 5). An
OCL constraint ensures that every action (belonging to
a single resource) is mapped to an operation belong-
ing to the component type of a component realizing
the resource. This mapping is also provided by the
designer.
1http://www.kermeta.org/docs/html.chunked/
KerMeta-Manual/ch02.html#section_weaving.link
2http://www.eclipse.org/modeling/emf/
• Each role is mapped to a component (Figure 6). This
proxy component provides and requires all the services
that a user of this role can potentially access.
• Each user is mapped to a component (Figure 6). By
default, this component is connected to the correspond-
ing role component.
• Each permission is mapped to a pair of ports and a
binding (Figure 6):
– Each permission granted to a role is mapped to a
pair of ports: a required port associated with the
role component, a provided port associated with
the resource, and a binding linking these ports.
– Each permission granted to a user is also mapped
to a pair of ports: a required and a provided ports
associated with the user component. The bind-
ings links the required port to the corresponding
provided port of the component corresponding to
the user’s role.
• Each delegation (Figure 7) is mapped to a pair of ports
and a binding. A required and a provided ports are
associated with the user (delegatee) component. The
binding links the required port to the corresponding
port provided by another (delegator) component.
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Figure 5: Mapping Resources to Architectural Con-
cepts
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Concepts
The initial architecture is automatically created by using the
mappings provided by the designer (resources and actions),
and by visiting the security model to set the woven refer-
ences. Figure 8 illustrates a simple architecture generated
from a security policy. The architecture has 4 layers: busi-
ness, resource, role and user. The bindings between com-
ponents from different layers indicates the permissions, and
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the bindings between user components indicates the delega-
tions currently active in the system. During the generation
of the architecture, bindings are not created if the rule is
not active.
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Figure 8: 3-Layered architecture reflecting access
control policies
In this section, we showed how the security (access control)
concern is composed with a base architecture, to finally ob-
tain a 4-layered software architecture. This mapping lever-
ages the meta-level aspect weaving facilities provided by the
Kermeta [19] language, as well as its model transformation
capabilities.
5. SECURITY-DRIVENDYNAMICADAPTA-
TION
In this section, we first present how we synchronize archi-
tectural models with a runni system. Then, we explain
how the architecture evolves when access control rules are
activated or deactivated. Finally, we show how we handle
deeper evolutions of the access control policy i.e., when rules
or roles are removed, created or updated.
5.1 Synchronizing the ArchitectureModel with
the Running System
Modern adaptive execution platforms like OSGi [21] pro-
pose low-level APIs to reconfigure a system at runtime. It is
possible to dynamically reconfigure applications running on
these platforms by executing platform-specific reconfigura-
tion scripts specifying which components have to be stopped,
which components and/or bindings should be added and/or
removed. These scripts have to be carefully written in order
to avoid life-cycle exceptions (e.g, when a component is re-
moved while still active) and dangling bindings (e.g., when
a component is removed while it is still connected to other
(client) components).
To prevent errors in writing such error-prone scripts, we rely
on our previous work that leverages MDE techniques to gen-
erate safe reconfiguration scripts [15, 16, 17], as illustrated
in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Leveraging MDE to generate safe recon-
figuration scripts
The key idea is to keep an architectural model synchronized
with the running system [5, 15, 16]. This reflection model,
which conforms to the architecture metamodel (Section 4.2),
is updated (Figure 9, 1) when significant changes appears in
the running system (addition/removal of components/bind-
ings). It is important to note that the reflection model can
only be modified according to runtime events. Still, it is pos-
sible to work on a copy of this reflection model and modify
it: model transformation, aspect model weaving, manipula-
tion by hand in a graphical editor, etc. In other words, the
reflection model is really a mirror of the reality (the running
system) and not a means for manipulating the reality.
When a target architectural model is defined (e.g. after
updating the access control policy), it is first validated (Fig-
ure 9, 2) using classic design-time validation techniques, such
as invariant checking [15] or simulation. This new model, if
valid, represents the target configuration that the running
system should reach. We automatically generate the recon-
figuration script, which allows to switch the system from its
current configuration to the new target. We first perform
a model comparison between the source configuration (the
reflection model) and the target configuration (Figure 9, 3),
which produces an ordered set of reconfiguration commands.
This safe sequence of commands is then submitted (Figure 9,
4) to the running system in order to actually reconfigure it.
Finally, the reflection model is automatically updated and
becomes equivalent to the target model (Figure 9, 1).
Readers interested in more details about the causal connec-
tion are referred to our previous works [15, 16, 17].
In the next two sub-sections we leverage this causal connec-
tion and the mappings (Section 4) in order to automatically
update the architecture when the security policy is modified.
5.2 Activation/deactivation of security rules
Default permissions can temporarily be deactivated for sev-
eral reasons: maintenance of a resource that requires the re-
source to be “oﬄine”, repression of bad or abusive behavior,
etc. In some cases, default permissions should be deacti-
vated for a particular role, while in some other cases they
should be deactivated for a particular user. Delegations are
temporarily activated by a user when he goes on holidays,
when he is not available, etc, and deactivated when the user
is back to work.
Deactivating a permission, either for a role of for a user, is
straightforward: it simply consists in removing the binding
associated with the rule. This way, the chain-of-responsibility
cannot process to the business components. Re-activating a
permission is exactly the opposite: we have to create a bind-
ing and insert it a the right place. Delegations are handled
exactly in the same way.
Figure 10 shows a code snippet written in Kermeta [19].
The aspect keyword means that we re-open the Permission
meta-class, defined in the security metamodel (Section 4.1,
Figure 12). We add 3 new references, corresponding to the
mappings we have defined in Section 4.3, and an operation.
The activate operation describes the impact on the archi-
tecture when a permission is activated. We first create a
binding (Line 8) and set the four references needed to prop-
erly introduce the binding: the client and the server ports
(Lines 9 and 10), and the client and server component in-
stances (Lines 11 and 12). The activation and deactivation
of permissions for particular users follow the same principle.
1 aspect class Permission {
2 // mappings to architectural concepts
3 reference server : Port [1..1]
4 reference client : Port [1..1]
5 reference binding : TransmissionBinding [1..1]
6
7 operation activate () i s do
8 var b : TransmissionBinding init
TransmissionBinding.new
9 b.client := self.client
10 b.server := self.server
11 b.serverInstance := self.action.container.asType
(Resource).resourceComponent
12 self.role.roleComponent.binding.add(b)
13 binding := b
14 end
15 }
Figure 10: The Permission meta-class aspectized
with Kermeta [19]
In Figure 8, we can see that John Smith has delegated his
role to Jane Smith. At the architectural level, this means
that the component associated with Jane Smith has now 3
additional ports that are delegated to the component asso-
ciated to John Smith. Jane Smith still has the permissions
associated with her role (Secretary), but she now also has
the permissions associated to the Director role, via the John
Smith component. In the same Figure, we can see that the
“bad student” user has lost all his permissions. However,
the permissions have not been deactivated for all the stu-
dents. At the architectural level, all the bindings formerly
connected to the component associated with the “bad stu-
dent” have been removed. In other words, the “bad student”
is now totally isolated from the system. The modifications
of the architecture, implied by the (de)activation of rules,
are automatically reflected to the running system using the
causal connection, as explained in Section 5.1.
At runtime, the removal/addition of binding is very fast.
It simply consists in calling a setter method on the client
component to (un)link it to/from a server. In the case where
the permissions of all the users of a given role should be
removed, we simply disconnect the role component from the
resource components. This way, we do not have to remove all
the (numerous) bindings between the user components and
the role component. In the case where a given user loses his
permissions, we remove the binding between its component
and its associated role component. This way, other users are
not impacted by this modification.
5.3 Evolution of the Access Control Policy
In the previous sub-section, we explained how the activa-
tion and deactivation of rules update the architecture, which
in turn dynamically reconfigure the system. However, our
model-driven approach also makes it possible to deeply mod-
ify the access control policy, by adding, removing, updating,
rules, resources, roles or users, which is very difficult and
often impossible using traditional security architectures [11,
7, 18].
For example, if the policy is too permissive, the security
manager would like to remove some permissions granted to
a role, or create a new role with less permissions. On the
other hand, a policy could be too restrictive to be actually
usable in practice. In the former security policy, only the di-
rector could create and update borrower accounts. To help
the director in this task, it has been decided that the admin-
istrator of the system could now also perform these tasks.
One possible solution would be to ask the director (John
Smith) to delegate his role (or at least the actions related to
borrower accounts) to John Doe, the administrator. Since
delegations are temporary by nature, this solution is not
well suited. The best solution is to modify the security pol-
icy by creating 3 new permissions to allow the administrator
to create, consult and modify borrower accounts.
Figure 11 focuses on the architectural elements related to
the administrator role before and after the change in the
policy. After the new architecture has been re-generated,
we can see that the administrator can now access to the
borrower accounts.
When the new architecture is submitted to our causal con-
nection, this produces the following reconfiguration script:
stop component John Doe
stop component Admin
unbind component John Doe from createPersonnelAccount interface
unbind component John Doe from consultPersonnelAccount interface
Borrower
Account
Admin
Personnel
Account
John Doe
User layer Role layer Resource layer
modify
create
consult
modify
create
consultAdminJohn Doe
Before
After
Figure 11: Architecture after 3 new permissions
have been added
unbind component John Doe from modifyPersonnelAccount interface
//same actions for the Admin component
remove component John Doe
remove component Admin
generate John Doe
generate Admin
add component John Doe
add component Admin
bind component John Doe to Admin via createPersonnelAccount interface
bind component John Doe to Admin via consultPersonnelAccount interface
bind component John Doe to Admin via modifyPersonnelAccount interface
bind component John Doe to Admin via createBorrowerAccount interface
bind component John Doe to Admin via consultBorrowerAccount interface
bind component John Doe to Admin via modifyBorrowerAccount interface
//same actions between Admin and PersonnelAccount
//same actions between Admin and BorrowerAccount
start Admin
start John Doe
5.4 Discussion
Unlike the classic architecture (based on PDP and PEP, see
Section 2.1), our architecture introduces several additional
components to properly manage access control. Indeed, we
introduce a component for each resource and each role de-
fined in the access control policy. These components are
implemented as OSGi bundles, and we rely on the OSGi
API to manage these components. The code of these com-
ponents is straightforward and efficient: it simply delegates
all their provided services to another component. For exam-
ple, the following script illustrates the pseudo-code of the
ResourceX in Figure ??.
op1(...){ myBusinessComponent1.op1(...)}
op2(...){ myBusinessComponent1.op2(...)}
op2(...){ myBusinessComponent2.op3(...)}
This code contains no logic (no reflection, no if-then-else, etc
to dispatch the calls), but a very simple indirection. User
components delegates to role components (permissions) or
to other user components (delegation). Role components
delegate to resource components, which finally delegate to
the business components, which contains all the business
logic. The code of these proxy components is automatically
generated using a code template. Since OSGi offers pow-
erful mechanisms to manage the classpath at runtime, it is
possible to generate, compile and package this code at run-
time. In the case where a user has the permission to use a
resource, it thus has to transit through 3 simple indirections:
user→ role→ resources→ business code. This is compara-
ble to the classic architecture: user→ eval(PDP)→ business
code, where we have 2 indirections, plus the evaluation of
the result of the PDP.
The activation/deactivation of permission simply consists
in setting a Java reference using a setter method, which is
automatically invoked during the reconfiguration step (see
Section 5.1). De-activating a permission thus “physically”
breaks the chain between the user and the real resources.
Our approach also reifies users as components. Unlike re-
sources and roles, we do not encapsulate these components
as OSGi bundles. Instead, we simply manipulate these com-
ponents as pure objects, similarly to session objects we can
find in applications that should handle multiple users. These
light-weight components are instantiated when needed e.g.,
when users log in, with no overhead comparing to classic
session objects.
6. RELATEDWORK
A substantial work [2, 4, 9] focused on access control for-
malization that guarantees flexibility and allows policies to
be easily modified and updated.
In this context, we present some of the work related to this
area. In [3], Bertino et al. proposed a new access control
model which allows expressing flexible policies that can be
easily modified and updated by users to adapt them to spe-
cific contexts. The advantage of their model resides in the
ability to change the access control rules by granting or re-
voking access based on specific exceptions. Their model pro-
vides a wide range of interesting features that increase the
flexibility of the access control policy. It allows advanced
administrative functions for regulating the specification of
access controls rules. In addition, their model supports del-
egation, which enables users to temporarily grant other users
some of their permissions (like a director would do during
his vacations).
In addition, Bertolissi et al. proposed DEBAC [4] a new
access control model based on the notion of event and that
allows the policy to be adapted to distributed and chang-
ing environments. Their model is represented as a term
rewriting system [1], which allows specifying changing and
dynamic access control policies.
As far as we know, no previous work dealt with the problem
of maintaining the alignment of access control policies with
the business logic by providing a process or a framework for
integrating this access control mechanism into the deployed
system. However, several researchers proposed model-driven
approaches for implementing model based methodologies for
securing applications. They focused on providing model
based methodologies for security. Some approaches were
proposed to help modeling access control formalisms in UML
diagrams such as RBAC or MAC. RBAC was modeled using
a dedicated UML diagram template [13]. In addition, Doan
et al. proposed a methodology [6] to incorporate MAC in
UML diagrams during the design process. All these ap-
proaches allow access control formalisms to be expressed
during the design.
UMLsec [10] which is an extension of UML allows security
properties to be expressed in UML diagrams. In addition,
Lodderstedt et al. [14] propose SecureUML which provides a
methodology for generating security components from spe-
cific models. The approach proposes a security modeling
language to define the access control model. The resulting
security model is combined with the UML business model
in order to automatically produce the access control infras-
tructure. More precisely, they use the Meta-Object facility
to create a new modeling language to define RBAC poli-
cies (extended to include constraints on rules). They apply
their technique in different examples of distributed system
architectures including Enterprise Java Beans and Microsoft
Enterprise Services for .NET. However, their approach does
not provide a flexible access control mechanism because up-
dating the rules implies generating the security mechanisms
again. The approach provides a tool for specifying the access
control rules along with the model-driven development pro-
cess and then automatically exporting these rules to gener-
ate the access control infrastructure. Our approach provides
a flexible access control architecture that supports updating
the access control rules.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we have presented an approach that leverages
Domain-Specific Languages, Model-Driven Engineering and
models@runtime. Access control policies are expressed by
a security expert using a dedicated DSML. This DSML is
mapped to another DSML describing (runtime) software ar-
chitectures. When the access control policy is modified, the
architecture is causally impacted. Finally, we reused our
previous work in order to synchronize architectural models
with a system running on a component-based platform. This
way, the running system always reflects the access control
policy.
In future work, we plan to extend this work according to two
different axis. First, along with the access control mecha-
nism, we will include support for usage control. Usage con-
trol aims at enforcing security rules specifying how the data
must be used, modified or distributed after access is granted.
In addition, we will try to complement our security mecha-
nism by adding new features like an intrusion detection sys-
tem able to automatically reconfigure the system. Second,
we plan to map other domain metamodels, such as workflow,
GUI, house-automation [20], etc to our architectural meta-
model connected to a running system. This way, it would
be possible to drive the execution of a software system by
manipulating domain concepts, rather than by directly ma-
nipulating the architecture.
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Figure 12: Access Control Metamodel
Figure 13: A Core Metamodel for Describing Runtime Architectures
